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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

11 March 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: [REDACTED]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA

SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report for Near East and South Asia

The February NESA Warning Meeting addressed the following topics:

1. INDIA/PAKISTAN: Border Tensions [REDACTED] a senior analyst for South Asia, made the primary presentation, with CIA responding.) The political rhetoric associated with border tensions has dropped measurably and there are indications that the local pullback is progressing. DIA remains concerned about the high level of Indian activity- [REDACTED]

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The difference between the military deployments and the effect they have had on the I&W problem on the one hand, and the state of political play on the other is striking. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The consensus of the community held that even though we do not believe either side wants a conflict, the situation demands careful monitoring. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

There was also a discussion of the community's assessment of the role of Rajiv Gandhi. Our view of Gandhi's decisionmaking style and agenda will play a central role in any assessment of Indian intentions and it has been a year or so since we last examined this question explicitly. A State/INR analyst said he thought we had applied a bit of wishful thinking in our early analysis of Gandhi, and in light of a variety of information, we should consider revising our assessments. A CIA analyst commented that it was also important to resolve which elements of the bureaucracy Gandhi is most predisposed to listen to. It appears he listens to the military more than the foreign policy apparatus.

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2. Libya/Chad: Showdown at Fada? The status of the fighting in Chad hasn't changed drastically in recent weeks. The most significant development has been the continued buildup of Libyan troops and material at Ouadi Doum, apparently in preparation for an attempt to retake Fada. Qadhafi was apparently stung by the loss of Fada and believes it is essential that it be retaken. The Libyans have been increasing the number of artillery tubes, tanks, and armored personnel carriers at Ouadi Doum, and we now believe there are as many as 5500 to 6000 Libyan troops there.

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[REDACTED] February, the Libyans had insufficient fuel and ammunition to begin an offensive [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] We also believe the Libyans would want to have more artillery available before commencing operations. The pattern in previous Libyan operations has been to pound the area with artillery prior to an attack. The community believes that once the Libyans have completed their buildup, they will be able to retake Fada. Habre might conduct successful spoiling attacks at, or around, Ouadi Doum or on the road between Ouadi Doum and Fada, but once engaged in a conventional defense of Fada, Libya's superior firepower likely will prevail.

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There is a range of opinion within the community about how the French would react if Habre's forces were being routed at Fada. One view holds that as long as Libyan forces stay north of the 16th parallel, the French

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will not engage directly in combat operations. Other analysts believe that the French would not allow the survival of Chadian forces to be threatened. Even the holders of this view believe the French will not actively assist the Chadians unless the situation becomes serious. [REDACTED]

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Qadhafi has the political situation in Libya under control in spite of increasing awareness and unhappiness with what is happening in Chad by both the military and the population at large. The longer the situation in Chad continues, the greater the problem for Qadhafi, especially if Libyan forces take significant casualties. If popular discontent rises, however, we would expect Qadhafi to adjust his policies to reduce the domestic pressures well before they threaten his grip on power. [REDACTED]

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Qadhafi's decision to move the government has not been popular but it has made a coup more difficult. The plan to decentralize and relocate the government has been in the works for two years and may have been accelerated by the US airstrike. The military is unhappy with the move and most senior officers fly in and out of the new headquarters daily. However, there are no military units in the region to threaten the government, the new capital is in Qadhafi's tribal heartland, and the location may make a US airstrike more complicated. [REDACTED]

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Warning Note

If Habre engages in a conventional defense of Fada, he will likely be defeated. We should not expect the French to prevent this, although they might intervene if the survival of the Chadian forces came into question. [REDACTED]

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The following components attended the NIO/NESA February Warning Meeting:

External

State/INR
NSA
NSA/G921
NSA/G922
USAF/INERM
DIA/JSI-3B
DIA/DE-4
DIA/DIO
Army ITAC
Army/OACSI/DAMI-FII
Army/DAMI-FIC

Internal

NIO/NESA
A/NIO/NESA
NIC/AG
NESA/SO/P
NESA/SO/S
NESA/RO
NESA/AI/M
FBIS/S&T
LDA/PPD
DDI/OIR
NPIC/IEG/NESAD

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